



A hierarchy is a collection of entities that are related and managed as a group. Those 
entities include permanent objects (the hierarchy handles), primary objects at the root 
of a tree, and other objects such as keys in the tree. NV indexes belong to a hierarchy but 
aren’t in a tree. Entities, other than permanent entities, can be erased as a group.
The cryptographic root of each hierarchy is a seed: a large random number that the 
TPM generates and never exposes outside its secure boundary. The TPM uses the seed 
to create primary objects such as storage root keys. Those keys form the parent at the top 
of a hierarchy and are used to encrypt its children. Chapter 15 goes into far more detail 
about keys.
Each hierarchy also has an associated proof value. The proof can be independently 
generated or derived from the hierarchy seed. The TPM uses the proof value to ensure 
that a value supplied to the TPM was originally generated by that TPM. Often, the TPM 
derives an HMAC key from the proof, and HMACs data that the TPM itself generates 
internally. When the data is later supplied back to the TPM, the HMAC is checked to 
verify the authenticity of the data.
A hierarchy can be persistent (retained through a reboot) or volatile (erased at 
reboot). Each hierarchy is targeted at specific use cases: for the platform manufacturer, 
for the user, for privacy-sensitive applications, and for ephemeral requirements.
Three Persistent Hierarchies
TPM 1.2 has one hierarchy, represented by the owner authorization and storage root key 
(SRK). There can be only one SRK, always a storage key, which is the lone parent at the 
base of this single hierarchy. The SRK is generated randomly and can’t be reproduced 
once it’s erased. It can’t be swapped out of the TPM. Child keys can’t be created and 
wrapped with (encrypted by) the SRK, and these child keys may in turn be storage keys 
with children of their own. However, the key hierarchy is under the control of the one 
owner authorization; so, ultimately, TPM 1.2 has only one administrator.
TPM 2.0, on the other hand, expands to three persistent hierarchies (platform, storage, 
and endorsement) to permit several use cases:
Using the TPM as a cryptographic coprocessor•	
Enabling or disabling parts of the TPM•	
Separating privacy-sensitive and -nonsensitive applications•	
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The three hierarchies have some common traits:
Each has an authorization value and a policy.•	
Each has an enable flag.•	
Each has a seed from which keys and data objects can be derived. •	
The seed is persistent.
Each can have primary keys from which descendants  •	
can be created.
The primary keys are somewhat analogous to the TPM 1.2 SRK. You could create a 
single RSA 2048-bit with a SHA-1 primary storage key, which would then be equivalent to 
the SRK.
However, TPM 2.0 adds more flexibility. First, primary keys aren’t limited to storage 
keys. They can also be asymmetric or symmetric signing keys. Second, there can be more 
than one (indeed, an unlimited number of) primary keys. This is useful because you 
might want keys of different types (storage, signing) and of different algorithms  
(RSA, ECC, SHA-1, SHA-256). Third, because there can be a large number of primary keys, 
it’s impractical to store them all in TPM NV memory. Therefore, unlike the TPM 1.2 SRK, 
the primary keys are derived from the secret seeds. The process is repeatable: the same seed 
value and key properties always result in the same key value. Rather than store them all, you 
can regenerate the keys as needed. Essentially, the seeds are the actual cryptographic roots. 
A primary key can be swapped out of the TPM, context-saved, and loaded for the duration 
of a power cycle, to eliminate the time required to regenerate the keys.
Because the hierarchies have independent authorization controls (password and 
policy), they can naturally have separate administrators. The TCG chose the three 
hierarchies and their slightly different operations to accommodate different use cases, 
which are somewhat reflected in their names. They’re next described in detail, along with 
the intended use cases.
Platform Hierarchy
The platform hierarchy is intended to be under the control of the platform manufacturer, 
represented by the early boot code shipped with the platform.1 The platform hierarchy is 
new for TPM 2.0. In TPM 1.2, the platform firmware could not be assured that the TPM 
was enabled. Thus, platform firmware developers could not include tasks that relied on 
the TPM.
1In an x86 PC platform, this early boot code was called BIOS. More recently, it’s called UEFI 
firmware.
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USE CASE: UEFI
the platform firmware must verify an rsa digital signature to authenticate software 
as part of the Unified extensible Firmware interface (UeFi) secure boot process. the 
platform OeM stores a public key, or a digest of a list of trusted public keys, in a 
tpM NV index. the controls on the index permit only the platform OeM to update it. 
During boot, the platform firmware uses this trusted public key to verify a signature.
the tpM provides two benefits. First, it provides a secure location to store the public 
key. second, it offers the rsa algorithm, so it need not be implemented in software. 




Unique among the hierarchies, at reboot, the platform hierarchy is enabled, the 
platform authorization value is set to a zero-length password, and the policy is set to 
one that can’t be satisfied. The intent is that the platform firmware will generate a strong 
platform authorization value (and optionally install its policy). Unlike the other hierarchies, 
which may have a human enter an authorization value, the platform authorization is 
entered by the platform firmware. Therefore, there is no reason to have the authorization 
persist (and to find a secure place to store it) rather than regenerate it each time.
Because the platform hierarchy has its own enable flag, the platform firmware 
decides when to enable or disable the hierarchy. The intent is that it should always be 
enabled and available for use by the platform firmware and the operating system.
Storage Hierarchy
The storage hierarchy is intended to be used by the platform owner: either the enterprise 
IT department or the end user. The storage hierarchy is equivalent to the TPM 1.2 storage 
hierarchy. It has an owner policy and an authorization value, both of which persist 
through reboots. The intent is that they be set and rarely changed.
The hierarchy can be disabled by the owner without affecting the platform 
hierarchy. This permits the platform software to use the TPM even if the owner disables 
its hierarchy. In TPM 1.2, turning off the single storage hierarchy disabled the TPM. 
Similarly, this hierarchy can be cleared (by changing the primary seed and deleting 
persistent objects) independent of the other hierarchies.
The storage hierarchy is intended for non-privacy-sensitive operations, whereas the 
endorsement hierarchy, with separate controls, addresses privacy.
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Endorsement Hierarchy
The endorsement hierarchy is the privacy-sensitive tree and is the hierarchy of choice 
when the user has privacy concerns. TPM and platform vendors certify that primary keys 
in this hierarchy are constrained to an authentic TPM attached to an authentic platform. 
As with TPM 1.2, a primary key can be an encryption key; and certificates can be created 
using TPM2_ActivateCredential, equivalent to the TPM 1.2 activate identity command. 
Unlike with TPM 1.2, a primary key can also be a signing key. Creating and certifying such 
a key is privacy sensitive because it permits correlation of keys back to a single TPM.
Because the endorsement hierarchy is intended for privacy-sensitive operations, 
its enable flag, policy, and authorization value are independent of the other hierarchies. 
They’re under the control of a privacy administrator, who may be the end user. A user 
with privacy concerns can disable the endorsement hierarchy while still using the storage 
hierarchy for TPM applications and permitting the platform software to use the TPM.
Privacy
Privacy, as used here, means the inability of remote parties receiving TPM digital 
signatures to correlate them—to cryptographically prove that they came from the same 
TPM. A user can use different signing keys for different applications to make correlation 
difficult. The attacker’s task is to trace these multiple keys back to a single user.
Privacy sensitivity is most applicable to home users who own and control their 
platform. In an enterprise, the IT department may control the platform completely 
and weaken the privacy features. This discussion is also concerned mostly with remote 
correlation—it doesn’t consider an attacker who can confiscate a platform.
The requirement for correlation is ensuring that the signing keys came from a 
single, authentic TPM. If the key can be duplicated on another TPM or is from a software 
implementation, the signature can’t be traced back to a single device.
The TPM vendor generates an endorsement primary seed, generates one or 
more primary keys from this seed, and then generates certificates for these keys. The 
certificates attest that the key is from an authentic TPM manufactured by the vendor. The 
platform manufacturer may create an analogous platform certificate. From primary keys, 
other keys are in some way certified.
If a primary key is a signing key and directly certifies other signing keys, correlation 
is simple, because all signatures converge at the same certificate. An attester seeing the 
certificate chain could prove that the attestation came from an authentic device. Further, 
the certificate chain can indicate that the key was fixed to that particular TPM. For this 
reason, primary keys in the endorsement hierarchy are typically encryption keys, not 
signing keys.
When the primary key is an encryption key, the process to create a descendent key 
certificate uses a more complicated flow, called activating a credential. The certificate 
authority is referred to as a privacy CA, because it’s trusted not to leak any correlation 
between the keys it has certified.
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Activating a Credential
The TPM doesn’t mandate a credential format, but the intent is something like an X.509 
certificate, where a credential provider such as a CA signs a public signing key and 
a statement about the key’s attributes. The credential process in the TCG model has 
multiple goals:
The credential provider can be assured of the key attributes it’s •	
certifying.
Receivers of the TPM key signatures can’t determine that the •	
multiple keys are resident on the same TPM.
The certificate authority could provide this correlation, but you can assume that this 
privacy CA would not normally do so.
In TPM 1.2, a key that can be activated is restricted to be an identity key (AIK), which 
isn’t migratable (can’t be backed up), is restricted to signing only TPM-generated data, 
and is always a child of the SRK. In TPM 2.0, all these restrictions have been removed 
while still achieving both of the previously stated goals.
In this description, recall that a TPM 2.0 key’s Name is a digest of its public data.  
It completely identifies the key. The digest includes the public key and its attributes.
The simplified concept is that the primary key is a decryption key, not a signing key. 
The CA constructs a certificate and encrypts it with the primary key public key. Only the 
TPM with the corresponding private key can recover the certificate. See Figure 9-1.
Figure 9-1. Activating a Credential
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The following happens at the credential provider:
1. The credential provider receives the Key’s public area and 
a certificate for an Encryption Key. The Encryption Key 
is typically a primary key in the endorsement hierarchy, 
and its certificate is issued by the TPM and/or platform 
manufacturer.
2. The credential provider walks the Encryption Key certificate 
chain back to the issuer’s root. Typically, the provider verifies 
that the Encryption Key is fixed to a known compliant 
hardware TPM.
3. The provider examines the Key’s public area and decides 
whether to issue a certificate, and what the certificate should 
say. In a typical case, the provider issues a certificate for a 
restricted Key that is fixed to the TPM.
4. The requester may have tried to alter the Key’s public area 
attributes. This attack won’t be successful. See step 5 in the 
process that occurs at the TPM.
5. The provider generates a credential for the Key
6. The provider generates a Secret that is used to protect the 
credential. Typically, this is a symmetric encryption key, but it 
can be a secret used to generate encryption and integrity keys. 
The format and use of this secret aren’t mandated by the TCG.
7. The provider generates a ‘Seed’ to a key derivation function 
(KDF). If the Encryption Key is an RSA key, the Seed is 
simply a random number, because an RSA key can directly 
encrypt and decrypt. If the Decryption Key is an elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) key, a more complex procedure using a 
Diffie-Hellman protocol is required.
8. This Seed is encrypted by the Encryption Key public key. It 
can later only be decrypted by the TPM.
9. The Seed is used in a TCG-specified KDF to generate a 
symmetric encryption key and an HMAC key. The symmetric 
key is used to encrypt the Secret, and the HMAC key provides 
integrity. Subtle but important is that the KDF also uses the 
key’s Name. You’ll see why later.
10. The encrypted Secret and its integrity value are sent to the 
TPM in a credential blob. The encrypted Seed is sent as well.
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If you follow all this, you have the following:
A credential protected by a Secret•	
A Secret encrypted by a key derived from a Seed and  •	
the key’s Name
A Seed encrypted by a TPM Encryption Key•	
These things happen at the TPM:
1. The encrypted Seed is applied against the TPM Encryption 
Key, and the Seed is recovered. The Seed remains inside  
the TPM.
2. The TPM computes the loaded key’s Name.
3. The Name and the Seed are combined using the same  
TCG KDF to produce a symmetric encryption key and an 
HMAC key.
4. The two keys are applied to the protected Secret, checking its 
integrity and decrypting it.
5. This is where an attack on the key’s public area attributes 
is detected. If the attacker presents a key to the credential 
provider that is different from the key loaded in the TPM, the 
Name will differ, and thus the symmetric and HMAC keys will 
differ, and this step will fail.
6. The TPM returns the Secret.
Outside the TPM, the Secret is applied to the credential in some agreed upon way. 
This can be as simple as using the Secret as a symmetric decryption key to decrypt the 
credential.
This protocol assures the credential provider that the credential can only be 
recovered if:
The TPM has the private key associated with the Encryption  •	
Key certificate.
The TPM has a key identical to the one presented to the  •	
credential provider.
The privacy administrator should control the use of the endorsement key, both as 
a signing key and in the activate-credential protocol, and thus control its correlation to 
another TPM key.
Other Privacy Considerations
The TPM owner can clear the storage hierarchy, changing the storage primary seed and 
effectively erasing all storage hierarchy keys.
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The platform owner controls the endorsement hierarchy. The platform owner 
typically doesn’t allow the endorsement primary seed to be changed, because this would 
render the existing TPM certificates useless, with no way to recover.
The user can create other primary keys in the endorsement hierarchy using a 
random number in the template. The user can erase these keys by flushing the key from 
the TPM, deleting external copies, and forgetting the random number. However, these 
keys do not have a manufacturer certificate.
When keys are used to sign (attest to) certain data, the attestation response structure 
contains what are possibly privacy-sensitive fields: resetCount (the number of times the 
TPM has been reset), restartCount (the number of times the TPM has been restarted or 
resumed), and the firmware version. Although these values don’t map directly to a TPM, 
they can aid in correlation.
To avoid this issue, the values are obfuscated when the signing key isn’t in the 
endorsement or platform hierarchy. The obfuscation is consistent when using the same 
key so the receiver can detect a change in the values while not seeing the actual values.
USE CASE: DETECTING A REBOOT BETWEEN ATTESTATIONS
an attestation server polls a platform at set intervals, verifying either that the pCrs 
haven’t changed or that the new pCr values are trusted. in tpM 1.2, the platform 
may have transitioned to an untrusted state and then rebooted back to a trusted 
state. the server can’t detect the reboot.
in tpM 2.0, the attestation data includes boot-count information. although 
attestations in the storage hierarchy have the information obfuscated, the server can 
still tell that a value changed and thus that a reboot occurred.
here are the steps:
1. Execute the TPM2_Quote command periodically.
2. each quote returns a TPM2B_ATTEST structure.
3. the quote includes the TPM2B_ATTEST->TPMS_CLOCK_INFO-> 
resetCount value.
4. resetCount is obfuscated with a symmetric key based on 
the quote key Name.
5. For the same key, the obfuscated resetCount has the same 
value if resetCount doesn’t change.
6. For a different key, the obfuscated resetCount has a 
different value, preventing correlation.
Separate from the three persistent hierarchies is the one volatile hierarchy, called the 
NULL hierarchy.
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NULL Hierarchy
The NULL hierarchy is analogous to the three persistent hierarchies. It can have primary 
keys from which descendants can be created. Several properties are different:
The authorization value is a zero-length password, and the policy •	
is empty (can’t be satisfied). These can’t be changed.
It can’t be disabled.•	
It has a seed from which keys and data objects can be derived. •	
The seed isn’t persistent. It and the proof are regenerated with 
different values on each reboot.
A subtle use case, which the normal end user doesn’t see, is that sessions, saved 
context objects, and sequence objects (digest and HMAC state) are in the NULL hierarchy. 
This permits them to be voided on reboot, because the seed and proof change. A user 
typically doesn’t change the endorsement hierarchy seed (because it would invalidate 
certificates), the storage hierarchy seed (because it would invalidate keys with a long 
lifetime), or the platform hierarchy seed (because the user may not have that capability).
Ephemeral keys are keys that are erased at reboot. An entire hierarchy, primary keys, 
storage keys, and leaf keys can be constructed in the NULL hierarchy. On reboot, as the 
seed changes, the entire key hierarchy is cryptographically erased. That is, the wrapped 
keys may exist on disk, but they can’t be loaded.
The TPM can be used as a cryptographic coprocessor, performing cryptographic 
algorithms on externally generated keys. Keys that have both a public and a private part are 
loaded in the NULL hierarchy, because they may not become part of a persistent hierarchy.
Cryptographic Primitives
TPM 2.0 can function purely as a cryptographic coprocessor. Although the following 
applications can be performed using any hierarchy, they’re best suited for the NULL 
hierarchy because it’s always enabled and the authorization is always a zero-length 
password. It’s thus always available.
I hesitate to call the TPM a crypto accelerator, because it’s likely to be slower than a 
pure software implementation. However, there are a few niche applications where these 
features are useful:
A resource-constrained environment, such as early boot software, •	
may not want to implement complex crypto math.
In a low-performance application, it may be easier for a developer •	
to use the TPM than to procure commercial software or vet an 
open source license.
Applications may deem hardware superior to software.•	
Applications could require a certified implementation, assuming •	
the TPM is certified.
The TPM primitives, random numbers, digests, HMAC, and symmetric and 
asymmetric key operations are described next.
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Random Number Generator
The TPM offers a simple interface to a hardware random number generator. It’s 
particularly useful when another source of entropy may not be available. Examples are 
embedded systems or early in a platform boot cycle.
The TPM can be considered a more trusted source of random numbers than the 
software generator. See the paper “Ron was wrong, Whit is right”2 for a discussion of 
issues resulting from poor software random number generators.
Digest Primitives
TPM 2.0 offers two cryptographic digest primitive APIs. Both are hash agile, permitting 
the hash algorithm to be specified in the call.
The simpler but less flexible option is TPM2_Hash. The caller inputs the message, and 
the TPM returns the digest. The message length is limited by the TPM input buffer size, 
typically 1 or 2 KB. The other API implements the usual start/update/complete pattern 
using TPM2_HashSequenceStart, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, and TPM2_SequenceComplete.
USE CASE: HASHING A LARGE FILE
in this use case, assume that the tpM input buffer is 2 KB. the user desires to  
sha-256 hash a 4 KB file. the user uses the tpM because the sha-256 algorithm 
isn’t available in software. the user uses the sequence commands because the file 
is larger than 2 KB.
here are the steps:
1. TPM2_HashSequenceStart, specifying the sha-256 
algorithm.
2. TPM2_SequenceUpdate two times, with a sequence of  
2 KB buffers.
3. TPM2_SequenceComplete to return the result.
this api is similar to that of tpM 1.2, but it has several enhancements:
it supports multiple hash algorithms.•	
the •	 start function returns a handle. More than one digest 
operation can be in progress at a time.
2Arjen K. Lenstra, James P. Hughes, Maxime Augier, Joppe W. Bos, Thorsten Kleinjung, and 
Christophe Wachter, “Ron was wrong, Whit is right,” International Association for Cryptologic 
Research, 2012, https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064.pdf.
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the •	 update function isn’t restricted to a multiple of  
64 bytes.
the •	 complete function can be more than 64 bytes.
the •	 complete function can return a ticket, which is used 
when signing with a restricted key. see the discussion of 
TPM_GENERATED for details.
USE CASE: TRUSTED BOOT
CrtM software would like to verify a signed software update. Because it’s resource 
constrained, it uses the tpM to digest the update, avoiding the need to implement 
the digest calculation in the CrtM.
tpM 2.0 offers TPM2_EventSequenceComplete as an alternative to  
TPM2_SequenceComplete. this command can only terminate a digest process where 
no algorithm was specified. this null algorithm causes the tpM to calculate digests 
over the message for all supported algorithms.
the command, an extension of tpM 1.2’s TPM_SHA1CompleteExtend, has two 
enhancements:
it permits the result of the digest operation to be extended •	
into a pCr. One pCr index is specified, but all pCrs at 
that index (that is, all banks) are extended with a digest 
corresponding to that pCr bank’s algorithm. Multiple digests 
are returned, one for each supported algorithm.
the sha-1 algorithm is being deprecated in favor of •	
stronger algorithms such as sha-256. this command, 
which can do both algorithms simultaneously, permits a 
staged phase-out of sha-1, because it can return multiple 
results and extend multiple pCr banks.
USE CASE: TRUSTED BOOT
TPM2_EventSequenceComplete allows software to measure (digest and extend) 
software using the tpM. it avoids the need for the measuring software to implement 
a digest algorithm.
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USE CASE: MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS TPM DIGEST ALGORITHMS
in one pass, the software can measure into pCr banks for several algorithms. a tpM 
may be unlikely to support multiple simultaneous pCr banks (multiple sets of pCrs 
with different algorithms). the current pC Client tpM doesn’t require this. But if one 
ever does, the tpM api supports it.
HMAC Primitives
TPM 2.0 supports HMAC as a primitive, whereas TPM 1.2 offered only the underlying 
digest API. The HMAC key is a loaded, keyed, hash TPM object. For a restricted key, the 
key’s algorithm must be used. For an unrestricted key, the caller can override the key’s 
algorithm. As with any key, the full complement of authorization methods is available.
As with digests, there are both simple and fully flexible APIs. TPM2_HMAC is the simpler 
API. You input a key handle, a digest algorithm, and a message, and the TPM returns the 
HMAC. The other API again implements the usual start/update/complete pattern, using 
TPM2_HMAC_Start, TPM2_SequenceUpdate, and TPM2_SequenceComplete.
USE CASE: STORING LOGIN PASSWORDS
a typical password file stores salted hashes of passwords. Verification consists 
of salting and hashing a supplied password and comparing it to the stored value. 
Because the calculation doesn’t include a secret, it’s subject to an offline attack on 
the password file.
this use case uses a tpM-generated hMaC key. the password file stores an hMaC 
of the salted password. Verification consists of salting and hMaCing the supplied 
password and comparing it to the stored value. Because an offline attacker 
doesn’t have the hMaC key, the attacker can’t mount an attack by performing the 
calculation.
here are the steps:
1. TPM2_Create, specifying an hMaC key (called a keyedHash 
object) that can be used with a zero-length, well-known 
password.
2. TPM2_Load to load the hMaC key, or optionally load and 
then TPM2_EvictControl to make the key persistent.
3. TPM2_HMAC to calculate an hMaC of the salted password.
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RSA Primitives
Two commands offer raw RSA operations: TPM2_RSA_Encrypt and TPM2_RSA_Decrypt. 
Both operate on a loaded RSA key. Both permit several padding schemes: PKCS#1, OAEP, 
and no padding. The loaded key’s padding can’t be overridden. The caller can, however, 
specify a padding scheme if the key’s scheme is null.
TPM2_RSA_Decrypt is the private key operation. The decryption key must be 
authorized, and padding is validated and removed before the TPM returns the plaintext.
TPM2_RSA_Encrypt is the public key operation. A key and a message must be 
specified, but no authorization is required for this public key operation. Padding is added 
before the encryption.
USE CASE: CRTM SIGNATURE VERIFICATION
a platform implements CrtM updates. the design requires that updates be signed, 
because compromising the CrtM subverts the entire platform. however, the CrtM 
is constrained in both code and data space. the CrtM would like to use the tpM to 
verify the signature.
the CrtM uses a hard-coded public key blob in a format ready to be loaded  
on the tpM. the key has a null padding scheme. the CrtM then uses the  
TPM2_RSA_Encrypt command to apply the public key to the signature, specifying 
no padding. Finally, the CrtM does a simply byte compare on the result against a 
padded digest of the update.
Symmetric Key Primitives
TPM2_EncryptDecrypt permits the TPM to perform symmetric key encryption and 
decryption. The function operates on a small number of blocks due to the TPM input 
buffer size. However, the API includes an initialization vector (IV) on input and a chaining 
value on output, so a larger number of blocks can be operated on in parts.
As with an HMAC key, a restricted key has a fixed mode. The caller can specify the 
mode when using an unrestricted key.
The key must be a symmetric cipher object. It must be authorized, and the full set of 
authorization options are available.
Symmetric key encryption is a sensitive subject. Although the TPM isn’t very fast, its 
hardware-protected keys are far more secure than software keys. It thus may be subject to 
import controls and may draw the attention of government agencies. For this reason, the 
PC Client platform specifies this command as optional.
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Summary
The TPM has three persistent hierarchies. The platform hierarchy is generally used by the 
platform OEM, as represented by early boot code. The platform OEM can depend on this 
hierarchy being enabled, even if the end user turns off the other hierarchies. The storage 
hierarchy is under the control of the user and is used for non-privacy-sensitive operations. 
The endorsement hierarchy, with its TPM vendor and OEM certificates, is under the control 
of a privacy administrator and is used for privacy-sensitive operations. The privacy-sensitive 
credential activation is typically performed in the endorsement hierarchy.
The NULL hierarchy is volatile. Sessions, contexts, and sequence objects are in this 
hierarchy, but an entire tree of volatile keys and objects can also be created here, ensuring 
that they’re deleted on a power cycle.
Besides its secure storage features, the TPM can be used as a cryptographic 
coprocessor, performing cryptographic algorithms on externally generated secrets or 
algorithms for which no secrets are needed. Its capabilities include a random number 
generator, digest and HMAC algorithms, and symmetric and asymmetric key operations.
